Introduction
In November 1959, African vigilantes in Kenya's capital of Nairobi set upon and assaulted Asian drivers they came across at random in the city streets. Such incidents were fired by widely felt anger and injustice directed at the colonial legal system that failed to prosecute Asian and European drivers who had been charged with running over and killing African pedestrians.
1 "Mob justice" at the scene of fatal road accidents, particularly those involving pedestrians and especially children, is no mere footnote to the histories of road safety in this East African country, as spontaneous acts of vigilantism in the wake of serious road accidents continue to be reported in the nation's newspapers and on television.
2 What was remarkable about this rash of beatings in 1959, none of them fatal, was its longevity in the memory of African Kenyans throughout the first decade of political independence from Britain (1963 Britain ( to ca. 1975 .
3 For a decade of Kenyan legislative history, these events were remembered whenever the question of "road safety" was brought to the attention of legislators and tied to other pressing controversies over infrastructure in the context of decolonization.
In exploring the topic of road safety in Africa, it is necessary to acknowledge the long shadow cast by the question of race and class in the development of automobility and its infrastructure. Like the colonial rail system, road networks and allied automotive industries in much of Africa were largely designed to cater to the needs and aspirations of minority settler societies. Transforming this colonial legacy and broadening access to the benefits of the "automotive age" to the majority African population was and remains a key challenge for cash-strapped postcolonial governments. But as the above example shows, this shift is not without its perils. Even as a growing percentage of African road users embrace automobility as part and parcel of a necessary march toward "development," an attendant increase in road accidents and fatalities has also resulted in deeply emotive and problematic interpretations of "road danger" in the popular imagination. These are fueled by changing perceptions of road safety interventions, and by Africans' own responses to their place in a shifting and as yet unequal technological landscape. This paper, among the first historical considerations of road safety in sub-Saharan Africa, compares the development of road safety in two African countries, Kenya and South Africa, as a way of examining both state and popular responses to the problem of road danger in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Rather than offering a comprehensive analysis of road safety on the continent, this selective approach allows us to consider the particular trajectories presented by these two countries, as well as providing useful points of comparison based on continuing empirical and ethnographic research in these two areas. 4 Historical affinities between the two countries further justify such a selection-the early presence in both countries of a significant white settler population, which drove initial outlays on road infrastructure and shaped highly racialized access to this expanding road network, have continued to define the manner in which the state and its citizenry perceive of and respond to the issue of road danger. Furthermore, the Transport Ministries of both Kenya and South Africa have publicly embraced the recently declared United Nations Decade of Action for Global Road Safety 2011-2020; this paper provides an important historical context through which these two regional powerhouses' participation in a more globalized road safety agenda can be understood. 5 The history of road safety in Africa has been relatively unexplored, especially when compared to the rich historiography on the topic in the developed world, to which several articles in this special issue contribute. 6 However, this study draws from a wider body of Africanist scholarship which has in the last two decades contributed to our understanding of African "road cultures" and the complex ways in which Africans utilize, and relate to, both roads and motor vehicles. This literature in part focuses on the diverse livelihoods Africans have crafted "on the road," as can be seen in Kenyan and South African participation in the unstable yet lucrative minibus taxi and miraa (khat) transport business. 7 Historical and ethnographic studies of emergent car cultures in Africa also reveal a vigorous local appropriation of automobile technologies as a form of ritual knowledge and a potent source of rumor, and show how passengers themselves actively seek to engage with the spiritual potentialities, and risks, of motorized transport. 8 The road itself in these studies emerges as a central, and highly ambivalent, figure in African moral imaginaries, linked to deeply historicized processes of signifying Africa's uneven and often exploitative encounter with modernity. 9 We begin with a consideration of two defining historical moments in the development of African automobility and its related infrastructure in these two countries-Kenyan "Africanization" in the first decade of Kenya's political independence from Britain, ca. 1963-75 , and democratization and economic liberalization in postapartheid (post-1994) South Africa. Although these are not parallel developments, we focus on these two moments as emblematic of how larger contexts of "infrastructural overload" and the historical legacies of colonialism's legal and actuarial institutions have shaped African automobility, as African automobility itself has in turn defined the politics of road safety intervention up to the present day. This discussion also yields important points of contrast: for example, whereas South Africa has developed an extensive domestic automotive industry, Kenya has only done so on a rudimentary scale, remaining dependent on the importation of (often secondhand) spare parts and motor vehicles, thus encouraging a transport system characterized by repair. 10 We then turn to recent and salient patterns in road safety intervention in both countries, while reflecting on their antecedents within colonial and apartheid-era dynamics. We argue that key developments in current road safety policies in both South Africa and Kenya have been influenced by the World Health Organization's (WHO) "epidemiological turn" with respect to accident and violence prevention made in the name of global public health, specifically modeled on approaches to HIV/AIDS. Both the South African and Kenyan states seem oriented to a behaviorist approach to changing people's conduct with respect to automotive mobility. State campaigns against speeding, overloading, and drunk driving are pervasive, but conspicuously absent from discussion in the public sphere are broader questions of socioeconomic inequalities rooted in earlier histories that have exacerbated many of the "dangerous" practices in and around motor vehicles, or along roads and highways. Public transport, where regulated by licensing and policing authorities in both countries, is highly competitive and hence exploitative of both passengers and transport workers, such as drivers and conductors. In addition, the licensing of public transport and commercial haulage is a highly politicized issue, reflecting the emer-9. Adeline Masquelier, "Road Mythographies"; Rosalind Shaw, Memories of the Slave Trade; Peter Chilson, Riding the Demon. Other non-Western treatments of automobility and road culture have informed this study. See Lewis H. Siegelbaum, "On the Side"; Richard Schweid, Che's Chevrolet, Fidel's Oldsmobile; Dmitris Dalakoglou, "The Road." 10. A similar argument is put forward by Siegelbaum with respect to the Soviet Union in the latter half of the twentieth century: "On the Side." Schweid also explores the repair cultures of Cuba's aging American vehicles and conversions using Soviet-era parts in Che 's Chevrolet, Fidel's Oldsmobile. gence of cartels whose ownership of the lion's share of licenses is linked to the institutionalized corruption of licensing authorities. The road safety approach targeting people's behavior in both of these nation-states is challenged by the pressures individuals endure in making a living in economies characterized by extreme differences in wealth and opportunity.
Finally, we turn to popular approaches in road safety. Although the relative reach and efficacy of governmental initiatives remain questionable, the topic of road safety itself has entered the public sphere and the public imagination in surprising ways. While some advocacy lobbies such as South Africa's Arrive Alive seek to harness civic awareness and activism through website blogs and an interactive web platform, it is the local media attention paid to the accidental deaths of high-profile politicians and entertainers which most significantly shapes public debates around road safety. Furthermore, it is evident that in some parts of Africa, adaptations in ritual practice, particularly around road accident sites and en route to funerals, can be seen as another important, albeit more culturally mediated, form of road safety intervention.
Kenya: The Peugeot and Africanization
Kenya's political independence from Britain in 1963 marks the real beginnings of mass automobility in this East African country. It is within the context of Kenya's Africanization policy in the first decade of postcolonial rule that "road safety" emerged as a legislative and institutional challenge for the fledgling republic. Choosing to situate Kenya's history of "road carnage" through an examination of this republic's first decade of political independence is not haphazard. As discussed in the introduction above, the question of class and race represents a continuous theme in attempts to mitigate road danger in Kenya through safety interventions and regulations during the country's half-century of postcolonial sovereignty. The 1960s and 1970s represent a watershed in Kenya's infrastructural politics in which mass automobility, road construction, economic development, and safety (mis)management were intertwined. One recent history of postcolonial Kenya even indicates that the number of fatalities and serious injuries tripled from 1963 to 1973, presumably exacerbated by the deregulated public transport industry known colloquially as matatu, Kenya's ubiquitous minibuses that carry passengers in town and country. 11 In this context, the policies and institutions that made up Africanization, building a national economy dominated by Africans, came to have significant effects on the further development of road safety and its current transformations. Africanization greatly expanded the transport sector in Kenya, encouraging above all African investment in public transport and commercial haulage, but also provoking highly ambitious attempts to reg-11. Charles Hornsby, Kenya. ulate the economic activities of multinational corporations in the transportation sector. One outcome of this was heavy borrowing by individuals to purchase vehicles while the newly independent government secured massive loans to build a transport infrastructure based on the automobile rather than the railways. Another outcome was a heavy infrastructural overload on Kenya's colonial-era road networks and an equally heavy cost in the number of road traffic accident fatalities and injuries.
Africanization thus led to two interrelated processes that continue to impinge on the development of Kenyan automobility and, by extension, road safety policies and perceptions of road danger. First, this period of borrowing led to an ongoing politics of indebtedness to the International Financial Institutes (IFIs), such as the World Bank, which precipitated later fiscal crises and structural adjustment in the 1980s, a period when Kenya's road infrastructure crumbled and road danger escalated. Second, in the interest of securing economic opportunities for all Africans in the transport sector, those with capital and those without, the Kenyan government since the 1960s has been torn between policies encouraging competition and those favoring regulation. For example, the private minibus industry in Kenya, matatu, figures prominently in public debates about the frictions of free enterprise and government regulation: seen through one optic as a paradigm of almost anarchic, "fend-for-yourself" business practices, rife with corruption and extortion; but also, viewed through another frame, as the target of periodic and recurrent government reforms, with attempts to bring "order" to "chaos" publicly declared by a variety of policing or revenue-gathering offices of government.
It is these two tensions, the politics of indebtedness and the external and global governance of the IFIs and economic policies split between "free-market" competition and "state-centrist" regulation, that best explain why reflecting on this period of Kenya's history informs further understandings of the current conditions and perceptions of road danger on the one hand, and the implementation of road safety initiatives and policies on the other.
In postcolonial Kenya, the Peugeot 404 became a material symbol of the promises of Africanization and political independence. These were the vehicles of choice among aspiring African politicians, emergent civil servants, and entrepreneurs who were among the first African Kenyan citizens to take on senior positions in government and business under the auspices of Africanization policies.
12 Africanization was a political process of building institutions that could open up Africans to lines of credit and jobs allowing them, for the first time, to invest in the development of Kenya's economy. By reversing the racial discrimination of colonialism in the public and private sectors, these policies set into motion a politics of recognition and, for a minority elite, a system of redistribution aimed at redressing colonial 12. Ibid. inequities. Through such policies, the careerist, educational, and entrepreneurial aspirations of a nascent African middle class were partially realized. One of its tangible proofs could be seen publicly in the soaring rates of car ownership. However, greater numbers of private cars driving on the competitive and exhausted colonial roads led to an unprecedented number of roadside fatalities and injuries.
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Besides private car ownership, entry into both commercial and public transport were viewed as newly opened areas of participation for this "subsidized elite," especially since the government encouraged investment in transportation by providing the licenses to permit African transporters to enter the business and, even more critically, by opening credit facilities which allowed Africans to take on loans guaranteed by parastatal lenders. Enabled by the rewritten Hire Purchase Act of 1970, these Kenyan citizens could access previously unattainable credit to purchase shiny new automobiles manufactured in France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan.
14 The Peugeot 404 in the mid-1960s was the car to beat, not only in the parking lots of dance clubs, but also in the famed East African Safari Rally. Peugeot capitalized on the successes of rally drivers through exotic advertising campaigns showing the cars ripping past savannah animals and indigenous bystanders. The man who brought such a car back to his family, friends, clients, and political supporters-sometimes with the factoryspecified plastic sheeting still covering the upholstery-was an image not only of success, but also of a newfound sovereignty-the "otherwise" colonial subject turned modern postcolonial citizen. 15 Many of these cars were still on Kenyan roads as late as the mid-1990s, some converted into taxis. But with economic liberalization policies during the 1990s and the proliferation of secondhand car imports from the Middle East and Japan, they have largely been replaced by newer, albeit previously owned vehicles. They still remain, however, somewhat nostalgic symbols of a period when Kenya was "on the move" and the "fruits of Independence" still fresh.
In the late 1960s, the Peugeot symbolized promotion through the ranks and for a fleeting moment in Kenya's history offered the shallow illusion of equal opportunity. Everywhere the suffix "-ization" was a self-evident nod at Africanization as explanation for the success of these cadres, and in 1970s Nairobi slang, a new term-kupujoo-was coined to qualify the rapid promotion of an individual through access to government loans and jobs. 16 13. "Number of motor-vehicles in Kenya, 14 July 1970," in KNAH. 14. "Implementation of Hire Purchase Act, Although such vehicles were sold for exorbitantly inflated prices from foreign firms, with credit created from nationalized debt, this new and young African milieu confidently bought into the kinematic world of automobility.
Part facilitator of work schedules that could find one in Kisumu in the morning and Kampala in neighboring Uganda by the late afternoon, and part cosmopolitan status symbol that confounded colonial racism in the car parks of Nairobi, privately owned sedans like the Peugeot 404 proliferated in the late 1960s on an infrastructure designed and built for Kenya's European minority and its crisis-ridden agricultural economy. The 404 in particular was viewed primarily as a "tarmac-only" car, quite unsuitable to the conditions of the national road network at the time.
17 While tarmac roads did exist, they were often in a perilous state of disrepair, sporting hazards like washed-out culverts, concrete roadside pillars, and gaping potholes.
18 Writing about the exhausted colonial infrastructure, particularly the tarmac roads, Colin Leys noted that the first major task facing the independent Kenyan government was massive road-building projects beyond the limit of the so-called White Highlands, reaching further into rural Kenya whose agricultural potential African entrepreneurs were keen to exploit. 19 The existing tarmac roads were largely concentrated around the settler highlands, the huge swaths of Kenya's most fertile land in the possession of a very few colonials, roads hardly designed with the sovereign aspirations of uhuru (freedom) in mind. Outside of this relatively expansive enclave, the most heavily traveled roads largely consisted of long, gravel-graded trunk roads, such as that which linked the coastal port of Mombasa to Nairobi, the nation's bustling interior capital city, a 330-mile distance bumpily and dustily traveled at stop-and-go speeds. It was along such routes that the Peugeot earned its ambivalent reputation as both dream machine and killer car.
From a design point of view, the Peugeot 404 sedan was desirable in multiple ways: its sleek and robust exterior made it aesthetically modern and tough; the luxurious interior made cross-country travel on gravel roads comfortable; and the speeds it could reach made long-distance road trips quicker. It was, however, most desirable for the ways in which ownership of one of these vehicles, especially if a personal car, melded into ideals of African modernity in the newly independent country. Seen in relation to its owners, such cars symbolized the speed of Africanization that could remake the colonized subject in the new imaginary of the sovereign African state. Embedded in the complex technical and infrastructural relata of machine and person, however, these Peugeots were also blamed for rising "road carnage" through a specific aspect of their design: they were too fast for Kenya's worn-out, dangerously engineered, or underdeveloped road infrastructure. 20 As a moment in the history of road safety in Kenya, and a defining one at that, Africanization institutionalized certain practices and policies that have shaped traffic law and transport regulation since. Public shock at horrific petrol-tanker explosions led to debates about the safety of Kenya's haulage fleets, leading to proposals-still pending action today-about safer alternatives such as the transportation of petrol through national networks of pipelines. A succession of parliamentary debates reflecting the place of road safety in national politics included, but were not limited to, the lack of infrastructural maintenance, the irregularity of police patrolling, the rampant corruption in regulatory bodies, speed limits and the installations of tachometers and speed governors, the quality of driving schools, the inefficiency of insurance companies to award compensation for the dead or wounded, the scarcity and poor quality of spare parts, and how to regulate and restrict the importation of secondhand vehicles. Today, these debates and concerns remain the objects of policy formation in Kenya's transport sector and have been pivotal in shaping not only road safety interventions, but also a certain tolerance toward road danger among all road users.
The years 1963 to 1975 were marked by a major extension of paved trunk roads and gravel transit corridors between the neighboring states of Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia, financed largely through the World Bank. The massive spending during this decade-long experiment with automobility contributed to later fiscal crises in the 1980s stemming from indebtedness. The subsequent deterioration of the postcolonial infrastructure was one of the effects of structural adjustment programs, particularly since maintenance work almost came to a complete halt. Until recent reconstruction efforts in the neoliberal 2000s, under the aegis of Chinese investment, much of Kenya's existing transport infrastructure dated back to this period of spending in the 1970s, a road network devastated by years of motor-vehicle overload and underfinanced or poorly managed public works maintenance.
Africans' expansion into road haulage during the 1960s had at least two effects that have a bearing on the politics of indebtedness and the divergence of state-centrist and free-market economic policies over this time period. The first was that increased infrastructural development-primarily the building of roads and bridges in rural areas outside the enclaves developed in the interests of the colonial economy-demanded an institutional nexus that could adequately regulate an industry that for the most part was being actively facilitated by state-centrist policies but frustrated, at the same time, by multinational and foreign interests. While postcolonial reforms of the monopolistic and concessionary character of transport policy under colonial governments led to more Africans taking to the roads and increases in road fatalities and injuries, the Africanization of transportation fostered Kenya's almost complete dependence on the import of motor vehicles and a severe undercapitalization in the development of an automotive industry of any noteworthy impact. The second effect, an unintended consequence, has been the overwhelming number of secondhand vehicles in the country. A constant state of "repair" attending to both cars and roads challenges the implementation of road safety initiatives. For the period concerned, evidence that road safety became an increasingly urgent problem was manifest in an increased surveillance of road death and injury on the one hand and an increase in the actual numbers of dead and injured on the other.
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South Africa: Automobility and Apartheid
As with the Kenyan situation, the process of de-racializing transport infrastructure and access in South Africa, although delayed by some three decades, was no less fraught with challenges. By 1960, with the publication of A Century of Transport: A Record of Achievement of the Ministry of Transport of the Union of South Africa, the ministry could, perhaps justifiably, reflect on its accomplishments: more than 5,000 miles of bitumensurfaced national highways had been created, and connected to an extensive system of provincial roads, many of them macadamized.
22 This formed the basis of an impressive mid-century expansion of the national road network, which was accompanied by a rapid increase in road users (with registered vehicles nearly doubling from 565,000 in 1950 to 1.1 million in 1960) and the consolidation of a domestic automobile manufacturing industry. 23 However, this shining "record of achievement" evident in the historical trajectory of South African automobility has its own glaring blind spot. When the Ministry of Transport boasted that the Union was by 1960 "one of the most highly motorized countries in the world," with its ratio of nearly one vehicle to three persons (compared to the United States ratio then of 2.67), it was of course referring only to the minority white population in its figures. Indeed, of the 1.1 million registered motor vehicles on record in 1960, only 100,000 were owned by non-whites. 24 In 1970, that ratio remained roughly the same, with whites owning 90 percent of registered vehicles. 25 For the vast majority of South Africans during the apartheid period , automobility was a far more circumscribed experience.
The mobility, more generally speaking, of the black African population was for much of the apartheid period highly regulated by the state. A host of legislation enacted in the 1950s-the Group Areas Act, the Native Urban Areas Amendment Act, the Population Registration Act, and the Natives Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act-laid the framework for a coercive system of control over African movement, particularly with regard to entry into and residence in urban areas. Under this legislation, Africans were seen as "temporary" residents of the city, their presence in mining towns and manufacturing centers justifiable only as units of labor. Nighttime police raids and invasive spot checks on city streets for identity cards, as well as negotiations with the labyrinthine bureaucracy that pervaded urban apartheid administration, became part of the daily rhythms of urban African life.
26 Within this complex apparatus, personal mobility came to be seen as both an ideological and literal threat to the apartheid state and to white privilege, not dissimilar to what Geoff Zylstra has thoughtfully observed in mid-nineteenth-century segregationist Philadelphia. 27 Not coincidentally, the design and placement of roads helped to consolidate state structures of surveillance and control over African movement. African townships built during the apartheid period were not only located at a considerable distance from the city center, they also tended to be separated from other racially zoned residential areas through "buffer strips" made up of stretches of parks, cemeteries, undeveloped land, and, indeed, roads and railways themselves. The apartheid cityscape thus came to resemble a "patchwork quilt" of separate, racially zoned residential areas with a limited number of transport corridors leading into them. 28 In addition, the strategic placement of broad access roads leading into and within African townships was a central feature of "modernist" apartheid urban planning, designed to allow quick and easy vehicular access for state security forces in the event of unrest, and to reduce the possibilities for effective crowd mobilization. 29 these residential areas were, for the most part, simply ignored. Limited public transport options servicing these outlying areas further emphasized the travails of the urban African working class, although as Gordon Pirie has shown, such inferior services provided flashpoints of protest.
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With the dismantling of apartheid legislation that began in the late 1980s and culminated in the transition to a democratic government in 1994, African mobility came to embody an altogether different sensibility -freedom. Young Africans, whose primary memory of daily life under apartheid was that "we were not allowed to just go around," celebrated the democratic elections with spirited bus-runs, in which they rode public buses "up and down" the city, simply "for fun" and because they could.
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They also marked their newfound physical freedoms by participating in public rituals of consumption. Indeed, the emergence in the postapartheid South African landscape of "mega malls" accessible only by motorized transport has typified how increased mobility has become an important enabler of the growing consumerism of the African population.
32 Unsurprisingly, this more individuated sense of mobility was also expressed through the purchase of motor vehicles. The number of registered motor vehicles, which had increased modestly from 4.8 million in 1993 to 4.9 million in 1994, took a dramatic leap in the year after the ending of apartheid, to 5.7 million in 1995. That upward trajectory continued in striking fashion through the 1990s. By 2000, 6.8 million vehicles were registered, while recent figures show that in 2006, 7.7 million vehicles were registered, out of a total population of 47.4 million South Africans.
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Domestic automotive production, which had gone through a serious slump in the 1980s when international political pressure forced many multinational companies to pull out or significantly reduce their capacity, experienced its own resurgence in the postapartheid period. In the 1990s, Alfa Romeo, Renault, and Chevrolet reinvested in the country. As of 2008, the major players in South Africa's automobile manufacturing industry included Ford, General Motors, Mercedes-Benz, Toyota, and Volkswagen. come a significant player in the global automotive industry, with exports heading to Japan, Germany, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom. It is a major exporter to the African continent, supplying most notably Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Ghana, and Algeria. 36 Attending to the burgeoning needs of this increasingly mobile population has posed significant challenges for the Ministry of Transport. Although the South African government has undertaken some infrastructural investments in the postapartheid period, most notably in the recent upgrading of roads and public transport networks in the lead-up to its hosting of the 2010 World Cup, the state has by and large relied on its existing stock of roads and transport links inherited from the apartheid regime. The shortcomings of this approach are clear to the many commuters on now highly congested metropolitan roadways, which were built without anticipating the ending of apartheid and its attendant exponential increase in road users. Another significant challenge is overcoming the legacy of the "axial" nature of public transport infrastructure, especially in cities such as Johannesburg where the demands for cross-suburban transport links to new business hubs in the northern suburbs have replaced older suburbanto-city-center transport routes. Like the spokes of a wheel, apartheid-era public transport routes, and the roads and railways which underpinned them, were principally envisioned to deliver workers from disparate satellite residential townships to the city center at the expense of viable transport connections between urban and suburban neighborhoods. 37 The demand for such routes has increased in the postapartheid period.
Finally, significant shifts in mobility patterns have become evident in the postapartheid period, as increased interurban movement as well as the in-migration of significant numbers of Zimbabweans, Congolese, and Somalians have further altered already fluid migratory dynamics. The increased traffic between urban centers and rural areas is another key postapartheid development, as African families that have over time become stretched across great distances reunite during holidays and at important events such as funerals. This has been buttressed by a resurgence of ethnic nationalism in the new dispensation, which has further emphasized the cultivation of urban Africans' "traditional" heritage through dutiful participation in often rurally based ritual events.
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The above patterns have become manifest in the South African roadscape through dramatically increased accident rates and fatalities in the postapartheid period. While the number of road fatalities hovered around the 10,000 per year mark for most of the 1980s and 1990s, the new millennium has seen that number climb rapidly to 12,800 in 2004 and a high of As Rosalind Morris indicates in her conceptual meditation on the "accidental age" in South Africa, although the road safety campaign Arrive Alive began with a two-pronged strategy that purported to focus both on strong governmental enforcement of road safety regulations and influencing road user behavior, it is the latter that came to dominate its agenda. The perils of speed, she argues, was the "primary explanatory factor" for road accidents, and the ministry responded through largely behaviorist interventions which sought to curb (rather unsuccessfully) the inclination to speed.
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By 1997, when the South African Department of Transport launched its Arrive Alive Road Safety Campaign, the alarming rise in road fatalities throughout the transitional period had clearly signaled the need for an urgent and coordinated response to road safety concerns on the part of the fledgling democracy. In 1998, the Annual Traffic Safety Audit prepared by the Automobile Association of South Africa showed the country's road fatality rates far surpassed those of the developed world, with South Africa registering a damning 181.83 fatalities per 100,000 vehicles, as compared to other developed countries with similar geographies: 21.62 in Australia and 21.53 in the United States.
41 It comes as no surprise, then, that the Ministry of Transport has framed road safety as a principle tenet in (and challenge to) South Africa's march toward development. 42 Crucially, it has explicitly linked the problem of road deaths to the country's other great public health challenge-that of HIV/AIDS. As Transport Minister Sibusiso Ndebele stated at the 2011 launch of the United Nations Decade of Action for Global Road Safety, "By all accounts the death of some 14,000 people every year, the death of at least 1,000 people every month, the death of no less than 40 people every day on South Africa's roads must be described as an epidemic." In the same speech, he used the strong civic engagement of grassroots organizations in affecting real change with regard to HIV/AIDS 43. Sibusiso Ndebele, "Address at the Launch of the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011 Safety -2020 treatment and prevention as a model on which locally based road safety movements could draw: "There is a movement against crime, a movement against HIV and AIDS; we now need a movement against road deaths." 43 Recent public service pronouncements encouraging seat-belt usage have similarly borrowed from the language of popular "condomize" campaigns, the message being, as one radio spot asserted, that if you truly "loved" your partner, you would ask him to buckle up (read "condomize").
This framing of road safety as a public health challenge has proved useful from the point of view of the Transport Ministry in impressing on the wider public the urgency of the issue, as well as providing a familiar language within which ordinary road users can engage with strategies of accident prevention. To its credit, the ministry has also tried to use the Arrive Alive website as a participatory forum to engage in a dialogue with the general public on issues relevant to road safety and awareness. On the website is a "road safety blog" to which disgruntled road users can contribute photos and onthe-scene reports of traffic jams, unsafe roads, and negligent driving. However, the stress on behavioral change in road safety campaigns has obscured a broader debate about more systemic factors, including poor road conditions, particularly in rural areas, lack of safe and adequate public transport options in urban areas, and wider structural inequality, all of which have consigned the poor to using unlicensed or unroadworthy secondhand vehicles, also contributing to South Africa's high accident and fatality rates.
The Kenyan case offers intriguing points of comparison and contrast with respect to the focus of state-sponsored road safety interventions as well as the rhetoric that framed these initiatives. Until the liberalization of Kenya's communications and broadcast industries in the late 1990s, road safety was characterized by a state-centrist approach, monitored by a loose coalition of "stakeholders" drawn from the police, transport unions, Transport Licensing Board, and Association of Kenya Insurers. By 2003, with the introduction of the so-called Michuki Rules, named after the incumbent transport minister, the Kenyan government moved to regulate the public transport sector, especially the fleets of privately owned minibuses, the matatu, in a bid to improve road safety and restore order to what the media sensationally claimed was collective insanity on the country's roads. Michuki Rules were a laundry list of requirements: all matatu had to be installed with "speed governors" restricting speed to a maximum of 80 kph; passengers were required to wear seat belts; drivers and conductors had to wear a uniform and openly display identification cards. Although these robust initiatives would come to be largely ignored in a matter of two years, the Michuki Rules are generally considered Kenya's most popular and successful attempt since independence to rein in "road carnage." Historically, such "crackdowns" highlight the complex regulatory framework through which transportation is governed and, hence, the challenging conflicts that erupt in the wake of centralized state intervention in the sector. In contrast, the South African government has shown a decided reluctance to intervene unilaterally in the largely unregulated minibus taxi industry, which has been historically dominated by powerful cartel-like taxi associations. Instead, its emphasis has been to offer cash incentives toward the purchase of new vehicles which pass certain safety requirements through a "recapitalization" program. 44 Kenya's road safety lobby has gathered momentum under the neoliberal development policies of President Mwai Kibaki, whose overhaul of urban transportation and building of new port facilities and transit corridors have set the country firmly on the path of an exponentially growing motorization. Where they can be relied on, statistics gathered by the Kenyan police for the year 2007 showed that there were 2,893 fatal accidents compared with 12,470 reports of non-fatal injuries. 45 Statistics vary wildly according to different sources, but credible numbers from the WHO in 2009 indicate 34.4 roadside fatalities for every 100,000 vehicles. Although the accuracy of much of the data collected is called into question by many observers, epidemiological appraisals demonstrate a 578 percent increase in road deaths for the period 1962 to 1992. Like South Africa's epidemiological turn, the Kenyan government has framed road deaths and injuries as an emergent public health problem. This re-branding of road safety as a problem of violence and injury prevention is likely to gain further momentum as the regional economy of East Africa (now including Rwanda and Burundi) recovers from the fiscal austerity and armed conflict of the 1980s and 1990s, largely through development policies rooted in infrastructural growth, especially investment in building additional motorways to accommodate the mass increase in registered, often secondhand vehicles. This has led to a further "infrastructural overload," demonstrated during 2010 by a scarcity of available license plates issued to new imports by the Kenya Revenue Authority.
Behaviorist agendas have a longer, troubled history, at least in the South African context. A sample of apartheid-era publicity posters produced in the 1950s by the National Road Safety Organization, a mid-twentieth-century forerunner to the Arrive Alive campaign, exemplifies this pattern of persuasion ( fig. 1) . What is striking in these images is the juxtaposition of a "tamed" Africa (and African) with more conventional road safety propaganda. In this imagined world of smiling mothers and dapperly dressed men in sharp suits, we are told that obedience begets safety. In the space bounded by those zebra stripes, even vulnerable springbok, as the anthropomorphized poster suggests, are safe from the predations of wild and aggressive drivers (cue the lion). 46 Such idealized snapshots em-47. Currently, roughly 40 percent of all road traffic fatalities in South Africa are pedestrians; see "Pedestrian Safety Manual and Advice." phasized the benign but ever-watchful gaze of the state, and at the same time trivialized the very real dangers African pedestrians faced, and still face, in South Africa's automobile-oriented roadscape. 47 Since 2003 in Kenya, aggressive top-down approaches to regulating the public transport sector have met with limited success in mitigating road danger, which is attributed to poor police enforcement of speeding, drunk driving, overloading, and seat-belt or helmet compliance. However, it signals an otherwise renewed institutional focus on road safety, especially as it is increasingly being framed as a problem for public health interventions. Many of these attempts are organized outside Kenya and represent a new turn in the shaping of road safety policy and propaganda. One such intervention, dubbed Heckle and Chide, was organized by Georgetown University researchers working in collaboration with local youth activists and representatives from the insurance industry.
48 It consisted of plying public transport minibuses (matatu) with stickers encouraging passengers to speak up against speeding drivers and assert their rights to arrive safely at their destinations. Couched in a language of "empowerment," the decals contained graphic, even gory, imagery of severed limbs, some still clad in clothing or shoes, and exhorted passengers to apply pressure on drivers to obey the Highway Code with the question, "Will YOU Survive the Matatu Ride? Speak Up, Stand Up." It aimed to draw on a new language and ethos of civic rights to combat a feeling of helplessness among passengers who, since the 1970s, felt they could not influence the recklessness of matatu drivers.
49 Popular satirical illustrator Maddo (Paul Kalemba) regularly features road safety in his weekly montage cartoons, including one that depicts a driver's response to such "empowerment" by slowing his Mombasa-to-Nairobi bus to a crawl, infuriating passengers intent on timely arrival at their destinations.
50
Organized grassroots initiatives to tackle road safety issues have been relatively absent in South Africa as compared to other contemporary developed motorized nations, although an important recent exception is the formation of South Africans against Drunk Driving (SADD), registered in 2006 by Caro Smit after her twenty-three-year-old son was killed by a drunk driver.
51 Indeed, the Transport Ministry's call to form local "road safety councils," to follow in the mold of earlier safety associations which appeared in the provinces of Natal, the Transvaal, and the Cape in the late 1920s and the 1930s, have for the most part gone unheeded. Kenya's highest-profile accidents tend to involve politicians, such as Mwai Kibaki's crash with a matatu during the 2002 general election campaigns, or the deaths of prominent popular musicians, such as rapper E-Sir (Issah Mmari), killed in 2003 on the notoriously competitive and dangerous Nakuru-Nairobi highway while returning from a concert. Some surviving celebrities, such as marathon runner Paul Tergat, have been spurred into action by their experiences, dedicating part of their public life to road safety activism. Popular musicians have also contributed to non-state road safety messages: Collo & Ulopa's "No More" commemorates the loss of Kenyan hip-hop artists E-Sir, Wicky Mosh, and Lady S and focuses explicitly on drunk driving and speeding. 54 Such songs condemning Kenya's poor safety record have a longer history, including Fundi Konde's 1950s "Ajali Haikingiki" (Accidents Can't Be Prevented), about a bus disaster in the Likoni Ferry channel near Mombasa. In mourning the loss of prominent people, however, the deaths of the many anonymous others killed in routine accidents, such as when pedestrians are struck by vehicles while crossing the road, has led to a certain toleration of high levels of road deaths, in turn trivializing the trauma experienced by the permanently injured.
In other contexts, how has road danger been perceived in African public culture and imagination? One can observe the development in the postapartheid period of a complex set of practices designed to offset perceived notions of road danger. As Gabriel Klaeger notes, praying "on the road" and specific "pacification rites" at identified high-accident sites are part of a repertoire of accident-prevention measures that experienced Ghanaian road users have employed. 55 Ordinary South Africans are confronting the perils of automobility in their own manner, most strikingly through an explicit dialogue with the (accidentally) dead. This communication may involve speaking with the spirit of the dead at the site of a fatal accident, in order to call the spirit back "home" as well as prevent future accidents. An episode of the popular South African television soap opera Isidingo illustrated this African practice for a multiracial viewership when members of the Matabane family are shown bringing back the wandering spirit of Letti from the site of her fatal car accident to the safe and enclosed boundaries afforded by the family home. They announce to Letti's spirit at the end of this ritual, "We are here, you are now at home with the people who love you." Dialogue with the dead may also involve speaking to the deceased body while it is en route to burial-a not altogether simple task as many urban South Africans may be buried in rural homesteads hundreds or even thousands of kilometers away-in order to ensure the safe passage of attendant mourners to the funeral and back. 56 Interestingly, as a point of comparison, there is little evidence of such spiritual communion in the Kenyan case, although the recent mushrooming of Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity in Kenya has ritualized collective prayers at the start and end of most long journeys by car or bus.
Conclusion
Road safety policy in both South Africa and Kenya is influenced in ways that perhaps developed motorized countries are not-by the WHO's "epidemiological turn" toward accident and violence prevention. In a continent perceived as historically ravaged by numerous epidemics, in recent decades including HIV/AIDS, it is increasingly common for road safety activists and public health experts to speak of an "epidemic on wheels," or of road death and injury as a "disease of development." What scholars need to be aware of, however, is the ideological effect of framing road safety in terms of public health, a historically emergent paradigm in its own right that disguises, especially in Africa, the infrastructural politics of automobility. Contests over the state's infrastructural power include the costs of Africa's historical indebtedness to the IFIs, an undercapitalized transport and haulage industry characterized by repair and secondhand vehicles, and an exploitation of speed to combat the extremely high costs of automotive transport on the continent. Global public health's highly visible presence in Africa, including its growth through the internet, following a quarter-century of research into HIV/AIDS indicates an emergent kind of infrastructural politics in which the African body is re-imagined as an object of intervention. Road safety and the epidemiological turn are emblematic of such "technopolitics," where road danger is presented as a problem to be resolved through legislation and medicalization, rather than an ongoing political problem rooted in historical social inequities. The epidemiological turn also tends to obscure popular understandings of road danger and the ways in which ordinary Africans debate and respond to situations and economies of risk.
We have sought to illustrate that these nation-states are by no means mere carbon copies of a "typical" Africa, but rather foils to accentuate and make visible each other's own histories of struggles with colonialism and enclave capitalism. In these divergent but comparable histories, roads and motor vehicles turn out to be ironic vehicles of political transformation, both instruments of oppression and liberation, and striking symbols of disappointments and aspiration. While this may ring true for many postcolonial countries' experiences of colonial domination and its painful overturning, it might be more rewarding to ask if the road safety "paradigms" espoused, for example, by the UN Decade of Action for Global Road Safety, are grounded state effects of automobile-producing countries. This is not to argue for the exceptionalism of the "developing world." Rather, it is to ask: what kind of governance leads to lowering the burden of road death and injury and what kinds of conceptual frameworks are used to explain this?
In conclusion and with reference to Peter Norton's admonition in his article in this issue, we see this preliminary exploration of the South African and Kenyan contexts as more "a starting point and an invitation to further research" than a definitive analysis of an "African" approach to road safety. 57 Yet Norton's framework is also a goad to gather evidence that road safety actually requires something like a "paradigm" for interventions to be viewed, ideologically at least, as successful in mitigating the social and human cost of road danger. Cast in humanitarian terms, these globalized road safety initiatives add further complexities to the situation on the road in countries like Kenya and South Africa, introducing new forms of global governance, but also replicating the form and meanings of public health activism on a continent long regarded by Westerners as dangerous and, indeed, a kind of technological and political black spot requiring intervention.
Underlying the framing of coherent paradigms in the African context are further complex questions regarding the allocation of responsibility for road safety in nation-states that have weak institutional capacities to regulate transport. Where such capacities and institutions exist, such as police or licensing boards, their infrastructural power is often systematically undermined by road users, many of whom are compelled to take huge risks to eke out a living. 58 While the state remains central to these processes, rarely are government institutions the dominant actors in outlining questions of responsibility over road death and injury, as we have attempted to illustrate. One trend, however, captures our attention: treating road safety as a problem of public health, a problem for which a solution is sought in a behaviorist approach focused on the individual.
In contrast to the burgeoning historiography of road safety in the developed world, the history of road safety on the African continent has yet to be written, let alone revised. The limited depth of primary and secondary sources at our disposal has necessitated a cautious wariness in assigning particular "paradigms" to the trajectories we have noted here. Even as we write, however, the scholarly landscape of this field is changing, just as the countries we write about are embracing "safety" as part of a new language of civic and human rights. 59. See Jan-Bart Gewald, Sabine Luning, and Klaas van Walraven, eds., The Speed of Change; see also special issue, "Land Politics in Africa: Constituting Authority over Territory, Property and Persons." 
